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The Challenge of Risk Characterization:
Current Practice and Future Directions
by George M. Gray, Joshua T. Cohen, and John D.
Graham
Risk characterization is perhaps the most important part ofrisk assessment. As currently practiced, risk
characterizations do not convey the degree ofuncertainty in a risk estimate to risk managers, Congress, the
press,andthepublic.Here,weuse aframeworkputforthbyan adhoc studygroup ofindustryandgovernment
scientists and academics to critique the risk characterizations contained in two risk assessments ofgasoline
vapor.Afterdiscussingthe strengths andweaknesses ofeachassessment's riskcharacterization, we detail an
alternative approach that conveys estimates in the form of a probability distribution. The distributional
approach can make use ofall relevant scientific data and knowledge, including alternative data sets and all
plausible mechanistic theories of carcinogenesis. As a result, this approach facilitates better public health
decisions than current risk characterization procedures. We discuss methodological issues, as well as
strengths and weaknesses ofthe distributional approach.
Introduction
Risk characterization, the process of integrating the
parts of a risk assessment into a form useful for commu-
nicating to risk managers and the public, is perhaps the
most important, but most overlooked, portion of risk
assessment. This paper critiques current approaches to
risk characterization and discusses a distributional
method that might better convey the mix of both knowl-
edge and uncertainty. The paperbegins with a discussion
of the risk characterization portions of two risk assess-
ments ofgasolinevapor,primarilywithin a"riskpresenta-
tion" framework advanced by an ad hoc committee of
experts from academia, industry, government agencies,
and public policythink tanks (1). Several key comparisons
are made to illustrate the uneven and cursory manner in
which risks are often characterized. Building on these
examples, an alternative approach to riskcharacterization
is described. The new approach, which entails construc-
tion ofaprobabilitydistribution onrisk, is discussed from
both the scientific and decision-making points of view.
Strengths and weaknesses ofthe distributional approach
are discussed as well as future directions for work in this
area.
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Gasoline Vapor Risk Assessments
and the Ad Hoc Study Group
Framework
Only two risk assessments that attempt to estimate
cancerriskfromgasolinevaporswereidentified, onefrom
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (2) and
one from the Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use
Management (NESCAUM) (3). Aqualitative reviewofthe
carcinogenicity ofgasoline vapors was undertaken by the
Health Effects Institute (HEI) (4), butbecause itmade no
quantitative estimates of risk, it was not included in this
analysis.
The risk presentation framework in which the risk
assessments were analyzed was developed by an ad hoc
study group sponsored by the EPA, the American Indus-
trial Health Council, the U.S. Department of Health and
HumanServices,andtheSocietyforRiskAnalysis(1).The
group's recommendations stress two main themes: a) the
need to be explicit when characterizing risks, stating the
uncertainties and assumptions thatunderlie the numbers,
as well as the rationale for the data and models chosen in
estimatingthe risk and b) use ofall relevant datain assess-
ing risk based on a weight-of-the-evidence approach, criti-
cally reviewing the data and examining the impact on the
risk assessment ofalternative data sets or models.
Table 1 outlines the full set ofrecommendations, break-
ing them into five general areas: general attributes, haz-
ard identification, dose-response evaluation, exposure
assessment, and risk characterization. Figure 1 alsoGRAY ET AL.
Thble 1. Comparison ofEnvironmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
Northeast States for Coordinated Air Use Management (NESCAUM) studies.
Attribute EPA (2)
General
Scope and objectives ofthe report are explicitly stated
Content is laid out impartially with a balanced treatment ofthe evidence bearing on the conclusions
Risk assessment presentation includes a description ofany review process that was employed,
acknowledging specific review commentary
Key findings ofthe report are highlighted in a concise executive summary
Explains clearly how andwhy its findings differ from other risk management reports on the same topic
Explicitly and fairly conveys scientific uncertainty, including a discussion ofresearch that might clarify
the degree ofuncertainty
Hazard Identification
All relevant information is presented and reviewed
Highlights critical aspects ofdata quality
Aweight-of-the-evidence approach is presented forjudgment as to the likelihood ofhuman
carcinogenic hazard and includes a clear articulation ofthe rationale for the position taken
Identifies research that would permit a more confident statement about human hazard
Dose-response evaluation
Valid data sets and plausible models for high-to-low dose and interspecies extrapolation are presented
in dose-response modeling
Presentation ofdose-response evaluation includes both an upper and lower bound ofpotency estimates
and, wherever possible, some measure ofthe central tendency
Offers an explicit rationale for any preferred data set(s) and model(s) used in dose-response
evaluation; strengths and weaknesses ofthe preferred data sets are discussed, and scientific
consensus or lack thereofis indicated for critical issues or assumptions
Reveals how dose-response relationships change with alternative data sets, assumptions, and models
Exposure assessment
Purpose and scope ofthe exposure assessment and the underlying methodologies are clearly described
Specific populations and subpopulations that are subjects ofthe assessment are clearly identified, and
the reasons for their selections and any exclusions are given
Available data are considered and critically evaluated, and the degree ofconfidence in the data
expressed (reasons for any data exclusion are presented)
Ifmodels are used, their bases are described, along with their validation status
Potential sources, pathways, and routes ofhuman exposure are identified and quantified; the reasons
why any are not included in the assessment are presented
Central estimates and upper and lower bounds on exposures or, ifpossible, the full population
distribution ofexposures are described and preferred estimates are noted together with supporting
documentation
Uncertainties in the estimates are described, and the relative importance ofkey assumptions and data
is highlighted
Research or data necessary to improve the exposure assessment are described
NESCAUM (3)
+ +
+
+
+
+ +
±
+
+
+
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
+
+
NA
NA
NA
Risk characterization
Major components ofrisk (hazard identification, dose response, and exposure assessment) are
presented in summary statements, along with quantitative estimates ofrisk, to give a combined and
integrated view ofthe evidence NA
Clearly identifies key assumptions, their rationale, and the extent ofscientific consensus, the
uncertainties thus accepted, and the effect ofreasonable alternative assumptions on conclusions and
estimates + +
Outlines specific ongoing or potential research projects that would probably clarify significantly the
extent ofuncertainty in the risk estimation - +
Provides a sense ofperspective about the risk through the use ofappropriate analogy - +
NA, not applicable.
details our subjective evaluation of the EPA and
NESCAUM risk assessments. Generally speaking, the
EPA (2) report did an admirable job of evaluating the
impact of alternative data sets, using either the female
mouse ormale ratcarcinogenicity data, aswell as alterna-
tive models for low-dose extrapolation. The NESCAUM
document (3)had anexcellentreviewofallhealtheffects of
gasoline vapors, not only the carcinogenic effects. On the
negative side, the EPA document had little to say about
what research could help decrease uncertainty about the
health effects ofgasoline vapors. Thebiggest drawback of
the NESCAUM report was its focus on upper-bound
estimates ofriskwith little acknowledgment ofthe uncer-
tainty in those estimates.
Key Features of the Gas Vapor Risk
Characterizations
We have chosen three ofthe study group recommenda-
tionsoutlinedinTable 1forfurtherdiscussionbecausethey
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illustrate some ofthe key challenges in risk characteriza-
tion. These recommendations are a) hazard identification:
aweight-of-the-evidence approachshouldbepresented for
judgment as to the likelihood ofhuman carcinogenic haz-
ard that includes clear articulation ofthe rationale for the
position taken; b) dose-response evaluation: all valid data
sets and plausible models for high-to-low dose and inter-
species extrapolation are presented in dose-response
modeling; and c) dose-response evaluation: the presenta-
tion of dose-response evaluation includes both an upper
and lower bound of potency estimates and, wherever
possible, some measure of the central tendency. In the
areas addressed by each of these recommendations, we
discusstheapproachtakenbythe EPAand NESCAUMin
their gasoline vapor risk assessment. We then presentthe
distributional approach as an alternative and illustrate
how it facilitates superior decisions.
Weight-of-the-Evidence Approach to
Characterize Human Carcinogenicity
When extrapolating results of carcinogenicity tests in
animals to humans, risk assessors must evaluate the
statistical, biological, and epidemiological evidence to
determine the relevance ofthe animal response to human
risk (5,6). In the case of gasoline vapors, some of the
important issues in determining its potential hazard to
humans include the carcinogenicity of wholly vaporized
gasoline versus the low boiling point fraction, the rele-
vance to humans ofmale ratkidney tumors (which maybe
caused by a species-specific mechanism), how to interpret
increases in mouse liver tumors in light ofthe high back-
ground rate, and the potential role ofbenzene in gasoline-
induced carcinogenicity (2,4).
EPA did a goodjob discussing both the relevant animal
and epidemiological data. In addition, EPAdetailed uncer-
tainties in the hazard identification process, explaining
why gasoline was classified as a B2 carcinogen. This
classificationisinterestinginlight ofthefactthatgasoline
vapor contains benzene, a group A carcinogen. EPA also,
very admirably, stressed that the conclusions reached in
other parts of the risk assessment, including potency
estimation and risk characterization, are based on the
assumption thatgasoline is ahuman carcinogen, an uncer-
tain prospect.
In contrast to the EPAs assessment, the NESCAUM
document (3) focused only on evidence supporting the
carcinogenicity ofgasoline andbenzene. NESCAUM gave
little credence to the relevance ofmechanistic research on
the male rat kidney tumor response or the toxicological
significance of whole gasoline versus the low-molecular-
weight fraction.
Neither EPA nor NESCAUM attempted to provide a
quantitative risk characterization based on the weight of
the evidence. Current risk characterization procedures
limitthe use ofweight ofthe evidence to hazardidentifica-
tion(i.e., thecarcinogen classification) stage,reportingthe
classification along with a separately assessed quantita-
tive risk estimate (5). Because it is not incorporated into
the numerical estimate of risk, uncertainty information
thatis partofthe hazardidentification stage is frequently
unclear andignored.As aresult, riskmanagersmayplace
the samepriorityonknownhumancarcinogenslikeradia-
tion as they do on animal carcinogens ofuncertain human
relevance like gasoline vapor (7).
Valid Data Sets and Plausible Models for
Extrapolation
For some substances, there are multiple animal bio-
assay data sets with different findings. Moreover, it is
often not clearwhich laboratory animal strain, species, or
sexis the best surrogate for humans. Despite these ambi-
guities, risk assessment procedures usually call for esti-
matestobebased onthemostpessimistic data set.Thatis,
risk assessment procedures must use data from the ani-
mal species, sex, and tumor site that give rise to the
highest potency estimate (8).
Numerous mathematicalmodels canbeused to extrapo-
late results from the high doses used in animal bioassays
to the much lower doses commonly encountered by
humans. Many risk assessment procedures make use of
onlyoneextrapolationprocedure. Forexample, the EPAas
aruleuses atechniquewhich,roughlyspeaking, estimates
thehighestpotencythatdoes notproduce a"verypoor" fit
to the data (9). EPA also uses one of a range ofplausible
interspecies scaling factors to convert animal doses to
their human equivalents (10).
Inthe case oftheirgasoline risk assessment, EPAwent
beyond their usual practice, comparing risk estimates
based on both rat and mouse data using three different
statistics (the confidence interval upper and lowerbounds
andthemaximum likelihood estimate) to extrapolate from
high to low doses. Moreover, EPA explains their choice of
one of these estimates over the others, although their
primary rationale was an attempt to build conservatism
into their estimate rather than a beliefthat their selected
data set and extrapolation technique yielded the best
representation of reality. NESCAUM made use of two
data sets (mouse and rat) but relied on a single statistical
model to derive upper bounds on risk, values which are
very similar for the two data sets.
Presentation ofUpper and Lower Bound
Values
Few risk assessments report both an upper and lower
bound on risk aswell as an estimate ofacentral tendency.
Moreover, there is little agreement onwhich statistics are
appropriate for each of these three values (7,11). For
example, the expected value, median, or mode (most likely
value) may be reported as the central estimate. Any
percentileinthedistribution maybereported as theupper
bound. Neither NESCAUM nor the EPA attempted to
report all three of these values. Instead, each reported
only an upper bound for their estimate ofrisk.
Distributional Approach
In contrast to the procedures used by EPA and
NESCAUM, the "distributional approach" to risk assess-
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ment portrays the full range of conceivable risks, all
weighted by their relative likelihood in light of current
evidence and scientific judgment. In other words, the
distributional approach describes theriskassociatedwith
a substance as a probability distribution over a range of
possible risk values. Though generating this distribution
involvesimplementationproblems (whichwediscusslater),
current risk assessment methods avoid these problems
only at the cost of leaving out information that may be
important to the risk manager (12,13). As the goal ofrisk
assessment is to provide any risk manager with all
insights that may be relevant to his or her decision, these
other methods do not facilitate optimal decision making.
We advocate the superiority of the distributional
approach in estimating potency values, showing that
failuretousethismethodleadstotheexclusionofinforma-
tion relevant to the risk manager. That is, judging out-
comes by the risk manager's own criteria, the distribu-
tional approach leads to better decisions on average than
do othertechniques. We argue specificallythat an optimal
potency assessmentmethodology mustinclude the follow-
ing characteristics: a) it must consider all relevant infor-
mation, including the relative importance ofdifferent data
sets and the plausibility of competing mechanistic theo-
ries; b) it must portray the full range ofpossible potency
values given all relevant knowledge (and ignorance)
regarding the substance; and c) it must assign to each
plausible potency value its relative likelihood. In other
words, it must portray the probability distribution of
potency values.
To illustrate the importance ofeach ofthe these items,
we showthattheycaneachaffectchoicesmadebytherisk
manager. Specifically, we imagine a risk manager setting
regulatory priorities for a collection ofsubstances akin to
EPA's new "risk-based priority setting procedure" (14).
We demonstrate that these factors can affect the risk
manager's priorities, and hence that failure to include
these items can result in suboptimal choices.
By focusing on a limited number of data sets, or even
just a single data set and implicitly assuming an underly-
ing carcinogenic mechanism, currently used potency
assessment methods do not take into account the impact
that these default procedures have on potency estimates.
Formaldehyde risk assessment demonstrates the impact
the data set selection can have on the potency estimate.
The Kerns et al. study (15), the largest and most exten-
sivelypeerreviewedformaldehydeanimalbioassay, serves
as the basis for virtually all formaldehyde risk assess-
ments. That study found an increase in both benign and
malignant tumors in the rat nasal cavity. Although most
potency estimates are based on only the malignant
tumors, somescientistsrecommendtheuseofalltumorsin
the nasal cavity (12). Suppose a risk manager were com-
paring formaldehyde and another substance that gener-
ated the same number of malignant tumors but did not
produce any benign tumors. Without knowledge of the
benign tumors caused bytheformaldehyde, the risk man-
ager might place the same priority on both substances.
However, knowledge ofthe benign tumors, alongwith the
factthatatleastsomescientistsbelievethemtoberelevant
to human cancer risk, might lead the risk manager to
place a higher regulatory priority on formaldehyde.
Assumptions about underlying mechanisms are also
critical. Science often draws inferences from an under-
standingoftheunderlyingmechanismevenintheabsence
of data. For example, our mechanistic understanding of
planetary motion leads us to suspect (very strongly) that
the sun rises on Jupiter even though we have no empirical
evidence tothiseffect(16). Ourassumptionsregardingthe
mechanism underlying cancer are particularly crucial
because we have no low-dose human data for the vast
majority of chemicals. In the best of cases, we have only
high-dose animal experiment data. The critical inferences
drawn regarding the effect of low-dose human exposure,
and hence the regulatory priority assigned by the risk
manager, depend on assumptions such as whether we
believe the chemical exhibits threshold or nonthreshold
behavior and whether we believe the carcinogenic mecha-
nism in animals is relevant to humans. In fact,judgments
about the underlying mechanism may lead the risk man-
agertoassigndifferentprioritiestotwosubstanceswhose
empirical data sets are similar. Because thesejudgments
are so important, risk assessmentprocedures that do not
considerallplausiblemechanisms do notfacilitate optimal
decisions.
Taking all this information into account, representing
thefull range ofpossible potencyvalues is alsoimportant.
Failure to express the full range ofpotential values may
cause the risk manager to make inconsistent decisions.
For example, current risk assessment approaches often
report conservative or upper-bound potency estimates.
These estimates often portray substances aboutwhichwe
know little, which is as worse than equally dangerous
substances about which we know much more. This is
becausewithlimitedknowledge,theplausibleupperbound
onpotencycanbemuch greaterthanitis ifweknowmuch
moreabout asubstance. Defenders ofthis approach argue
that caution is warranted when knowledge is limited. We
believe that the proper degree ofcaution is a choice to be
made by the risk manager, not the potency assessor. A
conservative potency estimate may lead a "risk-neutral"
risk manager (that is, someone interested in minimizing
expectedliveslost) toplace ahighregulatorypriorityon a
substance that will statistically generate fewer deaths
than another substance aboutwhich more is known.
Central estimates, such as the mean, maximum likeli-
hood estimate, or mode (most likely value) can likewise
mislead risk managers, depending on their values. For
example,reportingtheexpectedvaluedoesnotdistinguish
betweensubstancesthatarecertaintokill asmallnumber
ofpeople and substances that have a small probability of
killingmanypeople. Someriskmanagersmaybewillingto
accept a relatively small number of deaths to avoid the
small possibility of disaster. This type of trade-off may
underlie society's current trend toward favoring coal-
powered electric plants over nuclear plants. Pollution and
occupational hazards associated with the former are vir-
tually certain to kill people everyyear. However, this risk
may be more acceptable to society than even the small
possibility ofanother Chernobyl-type incidentwiping out
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entire regions. For"risk-averse" riskmanagersreflecting
societal wishes, reporting the expected number ofannual
deaths from nuclear power and coal-fired electric plants
does not capture all the relevant information. For these
risk managers, the full range of possibilities must be
reported.
Finally, in addition to the full range of potencies, the
relative likelihood of various values is also important.
Clearlytheprobabilityofextremevalueswillinfluencethe
regulatory priority a riskmanager places on a substance.
Evenifthe range ofvalues fortwo substances isthe same,
most risk managers will place a higher priority on the
substance forwhich higherpotencies are considered more
probable. The relative likelihood ofpotency values is also
important in determining which substances should be
furtherresearched. Ifabroadrange ofpotencyvalues are
possible, but only a narrow range is likely, then further
research is unlikely to yield new insights. Often, research
efforts are better spent on substances for which a broad
range ofvalues are similarlyplausible. In otherwords, we
can learn more by studying substances we do not under-
stand than we can from studying substances whose prop-
erties are already well known.
Implementation Challenges for
Distributional Analysis
Skeptics of the distributional approach might argue
against it on two grounds: a) the dependence of the
distributional approach on subjective judgments under-
mines its reliability and scientific objectivity, and b) it is
more difficult tounderstand assessments presented inthe
form of a distribution than it is to understand one or a
handful ofsummarystatistics. Thefirstoftheseproblems
stems from the effort to incorporate all relevant knowl-
edge. Here, relevant knowledge includes both the meth-
odology and results of specific experiments and the
scientific judgment regarding the relative quality and
applicability of different data sets and the plausibility of
underlying biological mechanisms. Currently used risk
assessment approaches often specify which data sets are
relevant and how they should be interpreted. Only uncer-
taintyarisingfromthe stochastic nature oftheexperiments
is considered in the assessment ofdifferent potencyvalues.
The relative likelihood of different theoretical carcino-
genic mechanisms, along with the relative importance of
different data sets, cannot be resolved by well-defined
procedures. Instead,thedistributionalapproachmustrely
on the subjective judgment of qualified experts. Tech-
niques for eliciting expert judgment are subject to a
number of difficulties (13,17,18). Experts tend to express
too much confidence in their opinions, and hence tend to
underestimateuncertainty. Moreover, itisnotalwaysclear
how to combine conflicting views expressed by different
experts. Finally, there is no universally accepted pro-
cedure to determine who the experts are. All of these
problems are active areas ofstudyinthe decision analysis
and expertjudgment fields (13,19).
Critics might argue that the lack of objective pro-
cedures for making these subjectivejudgments leaves the
process vulnerable to manipulation by interested parties.
But these subjectivejudgments cannot be avoided. Alter-
nativeriskassessmentproceduresmakethesamechoices.
The difference is that while the distributional approach
makes difficult decisions about the relevance of various
data sets and the plausibility of competing mechanisms
explicitly, other risk assessment approaches make these
decisions implicitly. Because the decisions are implicit,
currentlyusedrisk assessmentmethodologies aresubject
to a far more insidious form of manipulation than is the
distributional approach. These implicit, uniform decisions
are notonlywronginmanycircumstancesbutcannoteven
be debated because oftheir hidden nature.
Thesecond setofproblems associatedwiththedistribu-
tional approach stems from the presentation of the
potency values in the form of a probability distribution.
Other approaches present either a single number, or per-
haps a range ofvalues accompanied by a best or central
estimate of potency. But the complexity of a probability
distribution can be avoided only at the cost ofinformation
that may be important to the risk manager. Choosing
summary statistics to simplify the presentation of the
potencyassessmentnecessarilyinvolvesvaluejudgments,
choices that are not appropriate for the risk assessor.
Before concluding, we note thatin addition toproviding
the risk manager with needed information, the distribu-
tional approach encourages the scientific community to
conduct more helpful research. Scientists are more likely
toinvestigateissuesiftheybelievetheassessmentprocess
does not have built-in assumptions dictating a certain
point ofview. Theywill also be more likely to support the
risk assessment process ifthey do not see it as failing to
considerallrelevantdataorapplyinginflexibleapproaches
that are incompatible with empirical results. This advan-
tage has important implications for the EPA, which is
currently attempting to increase the input of scientists
from outside the Agency into the risk assessment and
regulatory process (20).
In summary, both the distributional approach and cur-
rently used assessment methods face the same difficult
choices. The distributional method is superiorto the stan-
dard approach because it makes use ofall available scien-
tific knowledge and deals with difficult judgments
explicitly. By doing so, it permits the risk manager to
make an optimal choice based on his or her values.
Next Steps
Because thetheoretical superiorityofthe distributional
approach is clear, its feasibility must now be demon-
strated. We have begun pilot projects to illustrate the
method ofdistributional analysis ofcarcinogenic potency
using formaldehyde and chloroform as demonstration
compounds. The formaldehyde analysis consists of the
construction ofaprobability tree and calculation ofa risk
distribution using our own judgmental probabilities (21).
the chloroform work goes beyond this, constructing and
eliciting probabilities for the tree with experts in risk
assessment and chloroform science. We urge others to
work to demonstrate the distributional approach.
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